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Abstract: 
In this paper we examine the causal impact of competition on management quality. We analyze the 
hospital sector where geographic proximity is a key determinant of competition, and English public 
hospitals where political competition can be used to construct instrumental variables for market 
structure. Since almost all major English hospitals are government run, closing hospitals in areas 
where the governing party has a small majority is rare due to fear of electoral punishment. We find 
that management quality - measured using a new survey tool - is strongly correlated with financial 
and clinical outcomes such as survival rates from emergency heart attack admissions (AMI). More 
importantly, we find that higher competition (as indicated by a greater number of neighboring 
hospitals) is positively correlated with increased management quality, and this relationship 
strengthens when we instrument the number of local hospitals with local political competition. 
Adding another rival hospital increases the index of management quality by one third of a standard 
deviation and leads to a 10.7% reduction in heart-attack mortality rates. 
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In the US and almost every other nation, healthcare costs have been rapidly rising as a proportion of 
GDP (e.g. Hall and Jones, 2007). Since a large share of these costs are subsidized by the taxpayer, 
and this share could increase in the US under planned healthcare reforms, policy makers are highly 
focused on improving cost efficiency in hospitals. Given the large differences in hospital 
performance across a wide range of indicators (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Propper and Van 
Reenen, 2010; Cutler, Huckman and Kolstad, 2009 and Skinner and Staiger, 2009)1, one route is 
through improving the management practices of hospitals.  
 
Economists have long believed that competition is an effective way to improve management and 
therefore productivity. Adam Smith remarked “monopoly .... is a great enemy to good 
management”2. Analyzing this relationship is hampered by two factors: first, the endogeneity of 
market structure and second, credibly measuring management. Identifying the causal effect of 
competition is challenging, but the fact that exit and entry are strongly influenced by politics in a 
publicly run healthcare system, like the UK National Health Service (NHS), offers a potential 
instrumental variable - the degree of political competition. Closing down a hospital is deeply 
unpopular and since the governing party is deemed to ultimately run the NHS, voters tend to punish 
this party at the next election if all or part of their local hospital closes down. A vivid example of 
this was in the 2001 General Election when a government minister was overthrown by a political 
independent, Dr. Richard Taylor, who campaigned on the single issue of “saving” the local 
Kidderminster Hospital (where he was a physician) which the government planned to scale down3.   
 
Hospital opening and closures of public hospitals in England are centrally determined by the 
Department of Health.4 Since the mid 1990s there has been a concentration of services into a smaller 
number of public hospitals.5 If hospitals are less likely to be closed down in areas because these are 
                                                 
1 This variation is not surprising – there is a huge variability in productivity in many other areas of the private and public 
sector (e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008 and Syverson 2010). 
2 The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter XI Part 1, p.148 
3 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2177310.stm. There is other anecdotal evidence. For example, the Times 
from September 15th, 2006 reported that “A secret meeting has been held by ministers and Labour Party officials to 
work out ways of closing hospitals without jeopardising key marginal seats....” 
4 The vast majority of hospital care in the UK is provided in public hospitals. Private hospitals operate in niche markets, 
specialising in the provision of elective services for which there are long waiting lists in the NHS. Private financing of 
healthcare (including all out of pocket payments) accounts for only 16.7% percent of UK health care expenditure (Office 
for National Statistics, 2008). 
5 There are three sets of factors driving this consolidation. The first is the increasing demand for larger hospitals due to 
the benefits from increased volume within specialities and the grouping of multiple specialities together (Hensher and 
Edwards, 1999)5. This has also led to extensive hospital closures in the US (Gaynor, 2004). The second is the dramatic 
population growth in suburbs since World War II, far from the city centers where many hospitals were founded in the 
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politically marginal districts (“constituencies”), there will be a larger number of hospitals in 
marginal areas than in areas where a party has a large majority. Similarly, new hospitals are more 
likely to be opened in marginal areas to obtain political goodwill. In either case, in equilibrium, 
politically marginal areas should benefit from a higher number of hospitals. Clear evidence for this 
can be seen from Figure 1 which plots out the number of hospitals per person in a political 
constituency against the winning margin of the governing party (the Labour Party in our sample 
period). When Labour’s winning margin is small (under 5%) there are about 10% more hospitals 
than when it or the opposition parties (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) have a large majority.   
 
Using the share of government-controlled (Labour) marginal political constituencies as an 
instrumental variable for hospital numbers we find a significant causal impact of greater local 
competition on hospital management practices.6 We are careful to condition on a wide range of 
confounding influences to ensure that our results are not driven by other factors (e.g. financial 
resources, different local demographics, the severity of patients treated at the hospital, etc.).  
 
The second problem with examining the impact of competition on management is measuring 
managerial quality. In recent work we have developed a methodology for quantifying management 
practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al, 2009). The measures, covering incentives, 
monitoring, target-setting and lean operations were strongly correlated with firm performance. In 
this paper we apply the same basic methodology to measuring management in the healthcare sector. 
We implement our methods in interviews across 100 English acute (short term general) public 
hospitals (known as hospital trusts) interviewing a mixture of 161 clinicians and managers in two 
specialities: cardiology and orthopaedics. We cover 61% of all NHS providers of acute care in 
England.  
 
We first show that our management practice scores are correlated with lower mortality rates from 
AMI7 and other surgical procedures, shorter waiting lists and better financial performance. While 
not causal, this suggests that the management measure has informational content. We then examine 
the causal impact of competition on management quality and health outcomes using our political 
                                                                                                                                                                   
19th and early 20th century. The third is the desire of policy makers to shift services from the hospital sector into the 
primary care setting. 
6 Each constituency returns a single member of parliament (MP) to the British House of Commons under a first past the 
post system. The party with a majority of MPs forms the government headed by the Prime Minister. 
7 Acute myocardial infarction, commonly known as a “heart attack”. 
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instrumental variables. We show that adding another rival hospital increases the index of 
management quality by one third of a standard deviation and leads to a 10.7% reduction in heart-
attack mortality rates. 
 
Our identification strategy fits into the growing literature on the effect of the political environment 
on economic outcomes. One strand of the literature compares the incentives of politicians under 
different political rules. In a majoritarian system, such as the British one, politicians will pay greater 
attention to areas where there is more uncertainty about the electoral outcome, attempting to capture 
undecided voters in such “swing states” by devoting greater effort to these states.8 In our paper, we 
exploit political concern over one particular policy, healthcare provision.  List and Sturm (2006) also 
look at a single issue – in their case, environmental policy at state level in the US – and show that 
when election outcomes are more uncertain politicians use this policy tool to attract undecided 
voters.  
 
Our paper also relates closely to the literature on competition in healthcare. Policy makers in many 
countries have experimented with various ways of increasing effective competition in healthcare to 
increase productivity. In England, reforms to the healthcare system have introduced more 
competition between hospitals (Gaynor et al, 2010). There is extensive publicly available 
information and patients can choose the hospital they wish to receive treatment from. There is no 
consensus in the literature, however, on the effects of competition on hospital performance, so our 
paper contributes to a more positive assessment of the role of competitive forces (as in Kessler and 
McClellan, 2000, for the US or Gaynor et al, 2010, and Cooper et al, 2010, for England).9 Finally, 
our paper is linked to the literature on productivity and competition more broadly including papers 
by Nickell (1996), Syverson (2004), Schmitz (2005), and Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007). 
 
                                                 
8 Theoretical models showing this include Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Persson and Tabellini (1999), Lizzeri and 
Persico (2001) and Miles-Ferretti et al. (2002). The latter three papers compare majoritarian with proportional elections 
and find that they lead to different size and compositions of public expenditure (which is due to different groups being 
targeted). Empirical evidence to support this includes Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Miles-Ferretti et al. (2002). 
Nagler and Leighley (1992) and Stromberg (2008) establish empirically that candidates allocate relatively more of their 
election campaign resources to swing states. Clark and Milcent (2008) show the importance of political competition in 
France for healthcare employment. 
9 For example, Dranove and Satherthwaite (2000) or Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999). 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the data, Section II describes the 
relationship between hospital performance and management quality, Section III analyzes the effect 
of competition on hospital management and Section IV concludes. 
 
I. DATA 
 
The data used for the analysis is drawn from several sources. The first is the management survey 
conducted by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) at the London School of Economics, 
which includes 18 questions from which the overall management score is computed plus additional 
information about the process of the interview and features of the hospitals. This is complemented 
by external data from the UK Department of Health and other health regulators, which provides 
information on measures of quality and access to treatment as well as hospital characteristics such as 
patient intake and resources. Finally we use data on election outcomes at the constituency level from 
the British Election Study. The descriptive statistics for all the relevant variables that are used in our 
analysis are in Table 1. 
 
I.A. Management Survey Data 
The core of this dataset is made up of 18 questions which can be grouped in the following four 
subcategories: operations (3 questions), monitoring (3 questions), targets (5 questions) and 
incentives management (7 questions). For each one of the questions the interviewer reports a score 
between 1 and 5, a higher score indicating a better performance in the particular category. A detailed 
description of the individual questions and the scoring method is provided in Appendix A.10 
 
To try to obtain unbiased responses we use a double-blind survey methodology. The first part of this 
was that the interview was conducted by telephone without telling the respondents in advance that 
they were being scored. This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s evaluation of the 
hospital’s actual practices, rather than their aspirations, the respondent’s perceptions or the 
interviewer’s impressions. To run this “blind” scoring we used open questions (i.e. “can you tell me 
how you promote your employees”), rather than closed questions (i.e. “do you promote your 
employees on tenure [yes/no]?”). Furthermore, these questions target actual practices and examples, 
with the discussion continuing until the interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the 
                                                 
10 The questions in appendix A correspond in the following way to these categories. Operations: questions 1-3, 
Monitoring: questions 4-6, Targets: questions 8-12, Incentives management: questions 7 and 13-18.  
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hospital’s typical practices based on these examples. For each practice, the first question is broad 
with detailed follow-up questions to fine-tune the scoring. For example, in dimension (1) Layout of 
patient flow the initial question is “Can you briefly describe the patient journey or flow for a typical 
episode?” is followed up by questions like “How closely located are wards, theatres and diagnostics 
centres?”  
 
The second part of the double-blind scoring methodology was that the interviewers were not told 
anything about the hospital’s performance in advance of the interview. The interviewers were 
specially trained graduate students from top European and U.S. business schools. Since each 
interviewer also ran 46 interviews on average we can also remove interviewer fixed effects in the 
regression analysis. 
 
Obtaining interviews with managers was facilitated by a supporting letter from the Department of 
Health, and the name of the London School of Economics, which is well known in the UK as an 
independent research university. We interviewed respondents for an average of just under an hour. 
We approached up to four individuals in every hospital – a manager and physician in the cardiology 
service and a manager and physician in the orthopaedic service (note that some managers may have 
a clinical background). There were 164 acute hospital trusts with orthopaedics or cardiology 
departments in England when the survey was conducted in 2006 and 61% of hospitals (100) 
responded. We obtained 161 interviews, 79% of which were with managers (it was harder to obtain 
interviews with physicians) and about half in each speciality. Furthermore, the response probability 
was uncorrelated with observables such as performance outcomes and other hospital characteristics 
(see Appendix B).11 
 
Finally, we also collected a set of variables that describe the process of the interview, which can be 
used as “noise controls” in the econometric analysis. These included interviewer fixed effects, the 
position of the interviewee (clinician or manager), and his/her tenure in the post. Including these 
controls helps reduce residual variation.  
 
                                                 
11 In the sixteen bivariate regressions of sample response we ran only one was significant at the 10% level (expenditure 
per patient). 
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I.B. Hospital Competition and Political Competition 
Since there are costs from treating patients far from where they live, healthcare competition always 
has a strong geographical element. Our main competition measure is simply the number of other 
public hospitals within a given “catchment area” for each hospital. We show experiments with a 
Herfindahl index as well which takes activity in the hospital into account, but the market shares are 
more likely to be endogenous (Kessler and McClellan, 2000), so our baseline estimates use the 
simpler measure. Our baseline results use a 30km radius (about one hour’s drive) around the 
hospital, but we also report robust results when using wider market definitions such as 20km or 
40km radius instead.12 
  
We use data on outcomes of the national elections at the constituency level from the British Election 
Study. We observe the vote shares for all parties and use these to compute the winning margin. We 
define a constituency to be marginal if the winning margin is below 5% (we also show robustness to 
other thresholds such as 3% or 7%). As hospitals usually have a catchment area that comprises 
several constituencies we use the share of marginal constituencies in a 30 km radius of the hospital 
as our main measure of political competition to match the hospital competition measures.  
 
Note that the typical hospital in the UK treats about 72,000 patients a year while the typical political 
constituency has about 70,000 voters. So the closure of a hospital in a marginal constituency by the 
Government has an important effect on potential voters, increasing the likelihood of the Government 
losing that constituency in the next election. In other constituencies where the Government has a 
large lead over (or lag far behind) opposition parties there are lower incentives to avoid hospital 
closures, as changes of a few percentage points in voting will not alter parliamentary outcomes given 
the “first past the post” electoral system.13 We exploit this combination of public hospitals and 
central controlled hospital closures to generate a quasi-experiment for the number of hospitals. 
 
There are three main parties in the UK (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat). We 
distinguish between marginal constituencies which are controlled by the governing party (Labour) 
and Opposition parties. We test and confirm that the strongest effects are in the Labour controlled 
                                                 
12 We use the number of public hospitals, as private hospitals generally offer a very limited range of services (e.g. they 
do not have Emergency Rooms).  
13 Britain’s “first past the post” system means that the party with the highest vote share in each constituency wins that 
constituency. In a proportional representation political system this incentive to keep hospitals open in marginal 
constituencies does not operate as Governments care about total votes. 
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marginal seats.14 Our key instrumental variable is therefore the lagged share of Labour marginal 
constituencies defined as constituencies where Labour won, but by less than 5%. We use Labour 
marginals in 1997 since seats which were marginal in the 1997 election were typically perceived as 
marginal from the mid-1990s until after the early 2000s15, which was a key period of extensive 
hospital consolidation.  
 
In some regressions we also condition on a flexible polynomial in the Labour vote share and identity 
of the winning party as this could reflect some unobservables correlated with health status in the 
hospital catchment area (and therefore the number of hospitals). 
 
I.C. Hospital Performance Data 
Productivity is difficult to measure in hospitals, so regulators and researchers typically use a wide 
range of measures16. The clinical outcomes we use are the mortality rates following emergency 
admissions for (i) AMI and (ii) surgery.17 We choose these for four reasons. First, regulators in both 
the USA and the UK use selected death rates as part of a broader set of measures of hospital quality. 
Second, using emergency admissions helps to reduce selection bias because elective (non-
emergency) cases may be non-randomly sorted towards hospitals. Third, death rates are well 
recorded and cannot be easily “gamed” by administrators trying to hit targets. Fourth, the volume of 
emergency admissions for heart attacks and surgery are relatively high, so reducing the noise in the 
death rates.  
 
                                                 
14 There are two reasons for this. First, Labour was the party in power so hospital closures were politically more 
associated with their Members of Parliament. Second, the period we examine was Prime Minister Blair’s honeymoon 
period in power during which Labour’s popularity was at an all time high, so its marginals were more at risk than 
opposition marginals as Labour’s vote share trended downwards as its early popularity eroded. 
15 The reason is Labour’s victory in 1997 was forecast from the mid-1990s onwards and their polling margin from 1997 
was relatively constant until the early 2000s.The Conservatives won a narrow (21 seat) victory in 1992, but became 
increasingly unpopular from the mid 1990s onwards, particularly after the election of Tony Blair as leader of the Labour 
party in 1994. So by 1995 Labour was far ahead of the Conservatives in the polls and maintained this lead into the 1997 
General Election. In the 2001 election Labour had a very similar margin of victory (167 seats) as the 1997 election (179 
seats). They still won the 2005 election but with a reduced margin (66 seats), with their popularity declining slowly 
between 2001 and 2005 (Crewe, 2005). There is a high correlation between the share of marginal Labour constituencies 
in 1997 and 2001 (0.73). 
16 See for example http://2008ratings.cqc.org.uk/findcareservices/informationabouthealthcareservices.cfm    
17 Examples of the use of AMI death rates to proxy hospital quality include Kessler and McClellan (2000), Gaynor 
(2004) and, for the UK, Propper et al (2008). Death rates following emergency admission were used by the English 
healthcare quality regulator in 2001/2. The AMI mortality rate is for all deaths within 28 days of admission, the 
emergency surgery mortality rate is for all deaths within 30 days of admission. 
http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/performanceratings/2002/tech_index_trusts.html 
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As a measure of access to care we use the size of the waiting list for all operations (long waits have 
been an endemic problem of the UK NHS and of considerable concern to the general public, Propper 
et al, 2010). As another quality marker we use MRSA infection rates, used as a measure of hospital 
hygiene.18 We use the hospitals’ operating margin as a measure for their financial efficiency and the 
average intention of staff intending to leave in the next year as an indication of worker job 
satisfaction. All of these measures have been used by the UK government to rate NHS hospitals in 
England. Finally, we use the UK Government’s Health Care Commission (HCC) ratings which 
represent a composite performance measure across a wide number of indicators. The HCC rates 
hospitals along two dimensions of “resource use” and “quality of service” (measured on a scale from 
1 to 4).19  
 
I.D. Other Controls 
First, we control for patient case-mix by including the age/gender profile of total admissions at the 
hospital level in all of the regressions.20 We also control for the total number of admissions to allow 
for the fact that better hospitals may attract more patients and raise their quality if there are 
economies of scope or scale.  Second, we control for the health of the population in the hospital’s 
catchment area by using the within-gender age distribution (22 groups) and the overall mortality 
rate. We also control for population density.  Third, we control for resources of the hospitals, which 
are all derived from general taxation. The (public) purchasers of health care cover a defined 
geographical area and are allocated resources on the basis of a formula that measures need for 
healthcare (essentially, the demographics of the area the hospital is located in). The purchasers use 
these resources to buy healthcare from hospitals, at fixed national prices, for their local population. 
Purchasers do not own hospitals nor are vertically integrated with hospitals.  This system is intended 
to ensure resources are neither used to prop up poorly performing local hospitals nor are subject to 
local political influence. However, we are concerned to ensure that we control for the impact of 
resources as they may affect both performance and quality of management and to ensure that our 
instrumental variables results are not driven by resources that may be associated with political 
                                                 
18 MRSA is Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus. 
19 We use the 2006 values as these are coincident with the timing of the survey and average across the two measures. We 
also report experiments where we disaggregate the index and construct our own (re-aggregated) index. See Appendix B 
for more details on the construction of this Pseudo-HCC index. 
20 Specifically we have 11 age categories for each gender (0-15, 16-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66-70, 71-75, 76-80, 
81-85, >85). Admission proportions are specific to the condition in the case of AMI and general surgery. For all other 
performance indicators we use the same variables at the hospital level. Propper and Van Reenen (2010) show that in the 
English context the age-gender profile of patients does a good job of controlling for case-mix.  
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marginality. We therefore considered a large set of measures of the quantity and quality of resources 
including whether hospitals have been given greater autonomy from central control (known as 
“Foundation Trusts”), the number of sites, the age building (a proxy for capital quality) and 
expenditure per patient as a direct measure of funding.21 
 
I.E. Preliminary Data Analysis 
The management questions are all highly correlated (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) so we will 
usually aggregate the questions together either by taking the simple average (as in the figures) or by 
z-scoring each individual question and then taking the z-score of the average across all questions (in 
the regressions).22 
 
Figure 2 divides the HCC score into quintiles and shows the average management score in each bin. 
There is a clear upward sloping relationship with hospitals that have higher management scores also 
enjoying higher HCC rankings. Figure 3 plots the entire distribution of management scores for our 
respondents (in the upper Panel A). There is a large variance with some well managed firms, and 
other very poorly managed. In Panel B we present a comparison between hospitals and UK 
manufacturing firms. 23 Hospitals clearly have lower management scores than manufacturing firms, 
particularly for incentives management as they have weaker links between performance and pay, 
promotion, hiring and firing. 
 
II HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
Before examining the impact of competition on management practices we undertake two types of 
data validation test. The first involves running a second independent interview, with a different 
MBA interviewer speaking to a different manager (or doctor) at the same hospital. We find that 
these independently run first and second interviews have a correlation in their average management 
                                                 
21 We also tried to include further control variables (results are not reported): a dummy for whether a hospital is a 
teaching or a specialist hospital, total hospital employment, the number of acute beds, the number of medical staff and 
doctor vacancy rates. The results are not sensitive to including these additional variables. 
22 Z-scores are measures normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Factor analysis confirms 
that there is one dominant factor that loads heavily and positively on all questions. As with the earlier work, there is a 
second factor that loads positively on the incentives management questions, but negatively on the monitoring/operations 
questions. This suggests that there is some specialization across hospitals in different forms of management. 
23 To make the samples somewhat comparable we keep only establishments who have between 50 and 5,000 employees 
and who are domestically owned (i.e. we drop multinationals from the manufacturing sample). Furthermore, in both 
panels we are using the average management score from only 16 comparable questions, because two questions on lean 
manufacturing are difficult to compare across sectors (questions 1 and 2 in Appendix A) 
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scores across the 18 questions of 0.530 (p-value 0.001), as plotted in Appendix Figure A1. While 
this correlation is less than unity, implying some variation in management practices across managers 
and/or measurement error in the survey instrument, it is also significantly greater than zero 
suggesting our survey is picking up consistent differences in practices across hospitals. 
 
The second type of data validation test is to investigate if the management score is robustly 
correlated with external performance measures. This is not supposed to imply any kind of causality. 
Instead, it serves as another data validation check to see whether a higher management score is 
correlated with a better performance.  
 
We estimate regressions of the form: 
ijijij
k
i uxMy  '  
where kiy  is performance outcome k (e.g. AMI mortality) in hospital i, ijM  is the average 
management score of respondent j in hospital i, ijx  is a vector of controls and iju  the error term. 
Since errors are correlated across respondents within hospitals we cluster our standard errors at the 
hospital level.24 We present some results disaggregating the 18 questions, but our standard results 
simply z-score each individual question, average these into a composite and then z-score this 
average.  We use 2005/6 average outcomes to coincide with the date of the management survey.  
 
Table 2 shows results for regressions of each of the performance measured on the standardized 
management score. The management score in the top row (A) is calculated over the 18 survey 
questions. The other rows show results based on the four different categories of questions. Looking 
across the first row higher management scores are associated with better hospital outcomes across all 
the measures and this relationship is significant in every case. This immediately suggests our 
measure of management has informational content. 
 
Looking in more detail, in the first column of Table 2 we present the AMI mortality rate regressed 
on the management score controlling for a wide number of confounding influences.25 High 
                                                 
24 We weight the observations with the inverse of the number of interviews conducted at each hospital. This gives equal 
weight to each hospital in the regressions. 
25 As is standard we drop observations where the number of cases admitted for AMI is low because this leads to large 
swings in observed mortality rates. Following Propper and Van Reenen (2010) we drop hospitals with under 150 cases 
of AMI per year, but the results are not sensitive to the exact threshold used. 
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management scores are associated with significantly lower mortality rates from AMI - a one 
standard deviation increase in the management score is associated with a reduction of 0.66 
percentage points in the rate of AMI mortality (or a fall in 4% over the mean AMI mortality of 
17.1). Since there are 37,000 emergency AMI admissions in aggregate this corresponds to 246 fewer 
deaths a year. Column (2) examines death rates from all emergency surgery and again shows a 
significant correlation with management quality.26 Column (3) shows better managed hospitals tend 
to have significantly lower waiting lists and significantly lower MRSA infection rates (column (4)). 
The financial performance measured by the hospital’s operating margin is higher when hospitals 
have higher management scores (column (5)).27 Column (6) indicates that higher management scores 
are also associated with job satisfaction (a lower probability of the average employee wanting to 
leave the hospital). In the final two columns we use composite measures from the HCC and compute 
a “pseudo HCC rating” by attempting to reverse engineer the process by which the original rating 
was calculated (see Appendix B). The management practice score is significantly and positively 
correlated with both of these measures.  
 
The lower panel of Table 2 repeats the exercise using the different categories of management 
practice questions, where each row is an individual regression. The results are very similar although 
the coefficients are less precisely estimated.28 Different categories are more strongly correlated with 
different performance measures in an intuitive way. For example “Lean Operations” has the most 
explanatory power for MRSA infection rates and a higher “Incentives Management” score 
significantly lowers the staff’s intention to leave the job.  
 
Overall, Table 2 indicates that our measure of management practices is positively associated with 
superior hospital outcomes across a wide range of performance indicators.29 
    
                                                 
26 We exclude two specialist hospitals from this regression as they are difficult to compare to the rest in terms of all 
emergency admissions.  
27 The operating margin is influenced by both revenue and costs per spell. As the revenue side is fixed (hospitals receive 
a fixed national payment per type of case, known as Payment by Results and similar to the US fixed payment per DRG 
system), the operating margin is effectively a measure of costs. 
28 This suggests that averaging over different questions helps to reduce noise. We also examined decomposing the 
management score even further. When regressing the scores for individual questions on the HCC rating, 7 out of 18 
questions are significant at the 5% level and of these only one is significant at the 1% level).  
29 Our results are also consistent with McConnell et al. (2009) who use the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) methodology 
to collect management data on 147 US addiction treatment programs, finding a positive management performance 
relationship. 
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III MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND HOSPITAL COMPETITION  
 
III.A Basic Results 
To investigate whether competition improves management practices, column (1) of Table 3 presents 
an OLS regression of management quality on the number of rivals in a hospital’s geographical 
catchment area. There is a positive and significant coefficient on this competition measure: adding 
one rival hospital is associated with an increase in management quality of 0.12 of a standard 
deviation. 
 
To address the endogeneity concern we use the political instrumental variable described above - the 
degree to which a hospital is located in a politically marginal area held by the governing Labour 
party. Column (2) reports the first stage indicating that the share of local Labour-controlled local 
marginal constituencies is highly significant in explaining increased total hospital numbers. 
Consistent with Figure 1, a one standard deviation increase in political marginality (0.109) leads to 
about 0.6 additional hospitals (0.638 = 0.109*5.850). In Column (3) we look at the IV results, and 
find a positive effect of the number of local hospitals on management quality that is significant at the 
10% level.  Adding an extra competitor increases the index of management quality by over one third 
of a standard deviation (0.361).   
 
The specification in columns (1) through (3) contains only very basic controls (population density 
and age, four interviewer dummies and whether the hospital was a foundation trust), so a concern is 
that the relationship between management quality and competition is driven by omitted variables. In 
columns (4) to (6) we include a richer set of covariates including area mortality rates, the age and 
gender mix of hospital patients, linear terms in the share of Labour votes and the identity of the 
winning party and other variables as discussed in section 1.30 The full set of results are in Table B3, 
but Table 3 shows that the coefficients on our key variables are little changed by these additional 
covariates and in fact the second stage coefficient in column (6) is 0.543, slightly stronger than in 
column (3). An alternative measure of competition is to use the “numbers equivalent” of the 
                                                 
30 The set of control variables used in this specification is identical to the ones used in Table 2, except for the additional 
controls for area demographics and population density. 
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Herfindahl Index (HHI).31 Including this instead of the number of hospitals we obtain a coefficient 
(standard error) of 0.636 (0.257) in the second stage, which is consistent with column (6).32 
 
Column (7) shows an alternative first stage where we also include an extra variable indicating the 
proportion of marginal constituencies controlled by the opposition parties. Although the coefficient 
on this variable is positive, suggesting that these areas are also likely to have more hospitals, it is 
smaller and insignificant at conventional levels. This is consistent with our interpretation that 
marginals controlled by the governing party are the ones with most political saliency. If we use just 
marginality regardless of the controlling party, we obtain a coefficient of 2.369 with a standard error 
of 0.899 in the first stage. In any case, when we use both instruments from column (7) in the second 
stage the results are very similar to just using Labour marginals (see column (8)). 
 
Finally, although our focus here is on the impact of competition on management quality, we could 
also consider the impact on more direct measures of hospital performance. We present OLS results 
in column (9) which indicates that hospitals facing more competition have significantly fewer deaths 
following emergency AMI admissions.33 Column (10) uses our IV strategy and indicates that there 
appears to be a causal effect whereby adding one extra hospital reduces death rates by 1.83 
percentage points (or 10.7% over the average rate of 17.1). 
 
III.B Robustness  
As noted earlier, none of the qualitative results depend on the precise thresholds used for catchment 
area or definition of political marginal. Using a 40km catchment area instead of the baseline 30km 
shows slightly stronger results (a coefficient on competition of 0.849 with a standard error of 0.337). 
Using a 20km catchment area gives a coefficient (standard error) on competition of 0.548 (0.294) in 
IV. Using a 3% (instead of 5%) threshold for marginality reduced the coefficient (standard error) on 
competition to 0.321 (0.158) in the IV estimates and increasing it to 7% magnified the coefficient 
                                                 
31 The HHI is an inverse measure of competition which ranges from 0 (very competitive) to 1 (monopoly). The “numbers 
equivalent” measure is calculated as 1/HHI. It can be interpreted as the number of equally sized firms that would lead to 
a particular value of the HHI. 
32 In the first stage we obtain a coefficient (standard error) on political marginality of 4.401 (1.203). 
33 Running the same OLS regressions but using each of the other seven performance outcomes in Table 2 as a dependent 
variable reveals that competition is associated with better performance in every case. However, competition is only 
significant for AMI mortality rates.  
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(standard error) on competition to 1.068 (0.482). We also considered adding higher order controls 
for Labour’s vote share or dropping Labour's vote share completely with robust results.34  
 
Is it possible that marginality is associated with higher healthcare funding? As we noted above, 
funding for healthcare is allocated on the basis of need and is a separate and more transparent 
process than hospital exit and entry, so there is no automatic association between funding and 
marginality. However, it is possible that lobbying by a marginal politician could lead to greater 
funding. We therefore added controls for funding (expenditure per patient) into the regression. The 
coefficient for this variable is insignificant in both stages and does not alter the coefficient on 
competition.35 We also controlled for the age of the hospitals’ buildings to test whether marginal 
constituencies received more resources in terms of newer capital equipment. In fact we find the 
contrary to be true: in marginal constituencies hospital buildings tend if anything to be older, 
presumably because hospital closures are rarer. 36 
 
Another possible confounding factor is capacity. Maybe when multiple hospitals operate in the same 
area this reduces the pressure on doctors so that they can improve management practices? One point 
to note is that weakening time pressure has ambiguous effects on management practices as it could 
lead managers to slack (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). We investigate this empirically by including 
capacity controls such as physicians per person in the hospital’s catchment area and physicians per 
patient in the hospital itself and find the results are robust.37 
 
Finally, a concern with the instrument might be that the lower risk of a hospital being closed down 
in marginal constituencies may decrease managerial effort because the Chief Executive is less afraid 
of losing his job (the “bankruptcy risk” model of Schmidt, 1997). This mechanism is unlikely to be 
                                                 
34 Using a squared and a cubic term for Labour’s vote share in addition to the linear one leads to a coefficient (standard 
error) on competition of 0.551 (0.208). Dropping the Labour vote share completely yields a coefficient of 0.534 (0.220). 
We also run the first stage of our IV specification using the number of private hospitals as dependent variable. We find 
that marginality is insignificant in this case. This constitutes another piece of evidence that our marginality measure is 
not picking up unobserved area health status. 
35 The coefficient (standard error) on the number of hospitals is 0.498 (0.211) and the first stage coefficient (standard 
error) on the marginality variable is 5.311 (1.438). 
36 Including building age, the coefficient (standard error) on the number of hospitals is 0.537 (0.306) and the first stage 
coefficient on the marginality variable 4.817 (1.613).  
37 For example, adding full time equivalent physicians per person in the hospital’s catchment area leads to a coefficient 
(standard error) on competition in of 0.849 (0.490) in column (6) and -2.146 (1.318) in column (10). The coefficient on 
physicians per person is insignificant and actually negative which suggests that lowering time pressure leads to 
managerial slack. Adding the number of physicians per patient in the hospital leads to a coefficient (standard error) in 
Table 3 of 0.502 (0.234) on competition in column (6) and -1.801 (1.034) in column (10).  
16 
 
material in the NHS, however, because the Government almost always fires the Chief Executive in 
poorly performing hospitals rather than closing them down. In the context of our set-up, the 
bankruptcy risk model still implies that marginality would cause a greater number of hospitals, but 
this would be associated with a decrease in management quality. We find the opposite: managerial 
quality increases with the number of hospitals. Furthermore, looking at the reduced form, 
management quality is higher in areas where there is greater political competition, implying that the 
bankruptcy risk model is unlikely to matter much in our data. 38 
 
III.C Discussion of magnitudes and mechanisms 
Magnitudes 
Why is the IV estimate of competition so much larger than the OLS estimate? Some of this might be 
due to attenuation bias or have a LATE (Local Average Treatment effect) interpretation39. But, most 
obviously, the reverse causality problem is likely to bias OLS towards zero as hospitals in the 
neighbourhood of a well managed hospital are more likely to be closed down. The closure is 
economically and politically easier to justify if patients have a good substitute due to the presence of 
a neighboring high quality hospital. Because of this, a higher management score would generate a 
lower number of competing hospitals, just as in the standard case where a very efficient firm will 
tend to drive weaker firms from the market. This would lead OLS estimates to be biased towards 
zero as we observe in Table 3.  
 
In terms of the magnitudes of the competition effect, the distribution of numbers of hospitals is very 
skewed (a standard deviation of 9.7 in Table 1). This is because of a bimodal pattern with a much 
greater density of hospitals in London (a mean of 30.7 and standard deviation of 2.1) than outside of 
London (a mean of 3.5 and standard deviation 3.8).40 So an increase of three hospitals is a more 
representative “standard deviation” experiment than an increase of ten hospitals. According to our 
                                                 
38 There is a coefficient (standard error) on political marginality of 2.800 (1.162) in the reduced form regression with 
management as the dependent variable – see Table B3 column (2). 
39 The LATE interpretation is that the effect of competition is larger on the compliers than non-compliers. Since 1945 
Britain has been a two party democracy with the Conservative party strong in the richer areas which because they were 
on average healthier had relatively fewer hospitals per person. If there are diminishing returns to competition we would 
expect a larger effect of adding hospitals in these "Conservative" areas. From the mid 1990s under Tony Blair, the 
Labour party made large inroads into these wealthier constituencies so in our sample period a typical Labour marginal 
was wealthier/healthier than the average Labour seat (in our data area mortality was 17% lower in the Labour marginals 
compared to the rest of the country). Thus, the group of areas induced to add an extra hospital by the instrumental 
variable (the compliers) are those likely to have a larger than average treatment effect on hospital performance, which is 
why the IV estimates could lie above the OLS estimates. 
40 The results are robust to dropping the 20 London hospitals. The instrument remains significant at the 5% level in the 
first stage and the coefficient (standard error) on competition is 0.756 (0.369) in the second stage.  
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estimates an increase of three hospitals would be associated with an increase in the management 
index of 1.6 standard deviations (using column (6)) and a 5.7 percentage point fall in AMI death 
rates (from column (10)). These calculations imply that the effects we identify are of economic as 
well as statistical significance. 
 
Mechanisms 
There are several routes by which competition could improve management practices. The first is 
simply through competition for patients. When a General Practitioner (the local “gatekeeper 
physician” for patients) refers a patient to a hospital for treatment she has the flexibility to refer the 
patient to any local hospital. Having more local hospitals gives greater choice for General 
Practitioners and so greater competition for hospitals. Since funding follows patients in the NHS, 
hospitals are keen to win patient referrals as this has private benefits for senior managers (e.g. better 
pay and conditions) and reduces the probability that they will be fired. The second mechanism is 
yardstick competition: with more local hospitals CEO performance is easier to evaluate because 
yardstick competition is stronger. The UK government actively undertakes yardstick competition, 
publishing summary measures of performance on all hospitals and punishing managers of poorly 
performing hospitals by dismissal (Propper et al, 2010). 
 
Finally, it might be that a greater number of hospitals improve management quality not through 
competition, as we have assumed, but rather via input markets. Good managers will find markets 
with a higher density of hospitals to be a more attractive labor market. Hospitals with more rivals 
will therefore be able to hire better managers, who will help to increase the quality of management 
practices. We think this mechanism is less likely as managers are relatively mobile across England. 
 
 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we investigate the impact of competition on hospital management and performance. 
We have described a new methodology for quantifying the quality of management practices in the 
hospital sector and implemented this survey tool in two thirds of the acute hospitals in England. We 
found that our measure of management quality was robustly associated with better hospital 
outcomes across mortality rates and other indicators of hospital performance.  
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We then exploit the UK’s centralized public hospital system to provide an instrumental variable for 
hospital competition. We use the share of marginal political constituencies around each hospital as 
an instrumental variable for the number of nearby competing hospitals. This works well because in 
the UK politicians almost never allow hospitals in politically marginal constituencies to close down, 
leading to higher levels of hospital competition in areas with more marginal constituencies. We find 
that more hospital competition appears to cause improved hospital management (and lower death 
rates). This suggests public sector competition is useful for improving management practices in the 
public sector. 
 
In terms of future work, a drawback of our paper is that it is cross sectional since the management 
data is only available for a single year. We are collecting a second wave of the panel, however, 
which will enable us to investigate whether recent policy changes encouraging more competition 
have had an effect on hospital performance. Second, it would be interesting to expand our sample to 
look at healthcare management in other countries. We have piloted some work along these lines and 
plan to implement this in the US and other nations. Finally, examining how hospitals of different 
management quality and ownership respond differentially to shocks could be very revealing 
(Duggan, 2000).  
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Observations
Management Quality (non-z-scored)    
Average Management Score 2.57 0.66 161
Average Operations Score 2.83 0.95 161
Average Monitoring Score 3.00 0.75 161
Average Targets Score 2.47 0.78 161
Average Incentives Management Score 2.35 0.70 161
    
Performance Measures    
Mortality rate from emergency AMI after 28 days (quarterly average, %) 17.08 7.56 156 
Mortality rate from emergency surgery after 30 days (quarterly average, %) 2.21 0.84 160 
Numbers on waiting list 4,893 2,667 160 
Infection rate of MRSA per 10,000 bed days (half yearly) 1.61 0.64 160 
Operating margin (%) 1.27 2.81 161 
Staff likelihood of leaving within 12 months (1=very unlikely, 5=very likely) 2.70 0.13 160 
Average Health Care Commission  rating  (1-4 scale) 2.25 0.68 161 
Pseudo HCC rating (standardized) 0.00 0.98 161 
 
Competition Measures   
 
Number of competing hospitals (in 30km radius) 6.89 9.68 161 
Number equivalent of Herfindahl index 6.92 8.49 161 
 
Political Variables   
 
Proportion of marginal Labour constituencies (in 30km radius, %) 4.82 10.91 161 
Proportion of marginal non- Labour constituencies (in 30km radius, %) 14.02 21.54  
Proportion of (all) marginal constituencies (in 30km radius. %) 18.84 23.23 161 
Labour share of votes (average of constituencies in 30km radius, %) 42.29 13.98 161 
 
Noise Controls   
 
Respondent a physician (i.e. not a manager, %) 21.1 40.9 161 
Respondent’s tenure in the post (years) 3.50 3.79 161 
 
Covariates   
 
Foundation Trust (hospitals with greater autonomy, %) 34.16 47.57 161 
Teaching hospital (%) 11.80 32.36 161 
Specialist hospital (%) 1.86 13.56 161 
Managers with a clinical degree (%) 50.38 31.7 120 
Building age (years) 25.98 8.37 152 
Expenditure per patient (£ 1000) 9.69 4.51 152 
Area mortality (average in 30km radius, per 100,000 population) 930 138 161 
Physicians (full-time equivalent) in 30km radius per 1,000 population 1.30 0.41 161 
Physicians (full-time equivalent) in the hospital per 100 patients 2.48 2.65 161 
 
Size Variables   
 
Number of total admissions (quarterly) 18,137 9,525 161 
Number of emergency AMI admissions (quarterly) 90.18 52.26 161 
Number of emergency surgery admissions (quarterly) 1,498 800 161 
Number of sites 2.65 2.01 161 
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Table 2: Hospital Performance and management practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Mortality rate 
from 
emergency 
AMI 
Mortality
 rate from all 
emergency 
surgery  
Waiting
 list 
(1000 
patients) 
MRSA  
infection  
rate 
Operating
Margin 
Intention of 
staff to leave 
in next 12 
months 
Health Care 
Commission 
(HCC) overall 
rating 
“Pseudo” 
HCC rating 
Mean 17.08 2.21 4.90 1.61 1.27 2.70 2.25 0
         
A. Overall Management  -0.664* -0.103** -0.204** -0.128* 0.005 -0.028* 0.127** 0.268*** 
Practices Score (0.395) (0.045) (0.099) (0.070) (0.003) (0.016) (0.053) (0.098) 
         
B. Operations -0.030 -0.056* -0.037 -0.116** 0.005 -0.007 -0.039 0.180* 
 (0.352) (0.030) (0.089) (0.057) (0.004) (0.013) (0.047) (0.093) 
         
C. Monitoring -0.381 -0.076** -0.057 -0.036 -0.001 -0.006 0.068 0.127
 (0.396) (0.038) (0.106) (0.068) (0.003) (0.012) (0.050) (0.090) 
         
D. Targets -0.721** -0.088** -0.231** -0.114* 0.004 -0.032** 0.132*** 0.165* 
 (0.354) (0.044) (0.097) (0.065) (0.003) (0.016) (0.050) (0.090) 
         
E. People Management -0.804** -0.069 -0.224** -0.082 0.004 -0.032** 0.195*** 0.273*** 
 (0.393) (0.046) (0.100) (0.070) (0.003) (0.016) (0.051) (0.095) 
         
Observations 140 157 160 160 161 160 161 161
         
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. Every cell constitutes a separate regression. The dependent variables in columns (1) 
through (4) and (6) are generally considered to be “bad” whereas those in (5), (7) and (8) are “good” – see text for more details. Management scores are standardized across the 18 
questions in Appendix A. These are coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors that are clustered at a hospital level below (the unit of observation is a management interview 
with a service line in cardiology or orthopaedics across 100 public acute hospitals). All columns include controls for whether the respondent was a manager or clinician, 9 regional 
dummies and the number of sites. Controls for case mix and total admissions are also included, but vary across columns (see text for discussion). All columns also include “noise controls” 
comprising interviewer dummies and tenure of the interviewee, foundation trust status, share of managers with clinical degree and joint decision making dummy. The observations are 
weighted by the inverse of the number of interviews with the same hospital. In Column (1) we drop hospitals with less than 150 AMI cases per year. Column (7) is average of HCC’s 
rating on resource use and quality of service. Column (8) is our self-constructed HCC rating based on several indicators.  
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Table 3: The effect of Competition on Management Practices  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Type of Regression OLS IV: First Stage IV: Second 
Stage 
OLS IV: First 
Stage 
IV: Second 
Stage 
IV: First 
Stage 
IV: Second 
Stage 
OLS IV: Second 
Stage 
Dependent variable Management  Number of  
Competing 
Hospitals 
Management Management Number of  
Competing 
Hospitals 
Management Number of  
Competing 
Hospitals 
Management Mortality rate 
from 
emergency 
AMI 
Mortality rate 
from 
emergency 
AMI 
           
Number of Competing 0.121**  0.361* 0.120*  0.543**  0.475** -1.099** -1.827* 
Public Hospitals (0.058)  (0.215) (0.068)  (0.220)  (0.202) (0.486) (1.037) 
           
Proportion of  Labour  5.850***   5.156***  5.296***    
Marginal 
Constituencies  
 (1.553)   (1.398)  (1.416)    
           
Proportion of  Non-       1.245    
Labour  Marginal 
Constituencies  
      (1.015)    
           
F-statistic of excluded instrument in 
corresponding first stage 
14.18   13.60  7.36   8.94 
General Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
AMI-specific controls No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 140 140 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. Competition is measured as the number of hospitals in a 30km radius around the hospital 
(the “catchment area”) unless otherwise stated. A political constituency is defined as marginal if it was won by less than 5% in the 1997 General Election (proportion of marginal 
constituencies is based on the catchment area). The Labour share of votes is the absolute share obtained by the Governing party in the 1997 UK General Election averaged over all 
constituencies in the catchment area. Standard errors are clustered at a hospital level (the unit of observation is a service line in cardiology or orthopaedics). All columns include controls 
for the total population and age profile (11 categories) in the catchment area, whether the hospital was a Foundation Trust and interviewer dummies (4). “General controls” include share of 
Labour votes, the number of political constituencies and average mortality in the catchment area; the tenure of the respondent and whether she was a manager or clinician, 9 regional 
dummies, the number of hospital sites, number of total admissions and the “case-mix” (age/gender profile of admissions), share of managers with a clinical degree and a dummy for 
whether there was joint decision making at the hospital level. “AMI specific controls” are those in Table 2 column (1).  
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Figure 1: Governing (Labour) Party’s Winning Margin 
and the Number of Acute Hospitals in a Political Constituency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the mean number of hospitals per 1 million people within a 30km radius of the centroid of a 
political constituency against the “winning margin” in 1997 of the governing party (Labour). When Labour is not the 
winning party, the margin is the negative of the difference between the winning party (usually Conservative) and the 
next closest party. The margin is denoted “x”. There are 528  political constituencies in England. 
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Figure 2: Management Score by quintiles of average HCC rating 
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Notes: The Health Care Commission (HCC) is an NHS regulator who gives every hospital in England an aggregate 
performance score across seven domains (see Appendix B). We divide the HCC average score into quintiles from lowest 
score (first) to highest score (fifth) along the x-axis. We show the average management score (over all 18 questions) in 
each of the quintiles on the y-axis. The better performing hospitals have higher management scores. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Management Scores in Hospitals and 
Manufacturing Firms 
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Management Scores  
in Hospitals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  
Management Scores  
In Manufacturing Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These are the distributions of the management score for hospitals and manufacturing firms. Only establishments 
who have between 50 and 5000 employees and who are domestically owned (i.e. multinationals were dropped from the 
manufacturing sample) were used here. Also observations with a low reliability score (below 3) were dropped. The 
vertical line represents the average management score in each sample. Only the 16 questions for which manufacturing 
and healthcare are comparable (questions 3 to 18) were used. 
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APPENDIX A: MANAGEMENT PRACTICE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
FOR THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR 
Any score from 1 to 5 can be given, but the scoring guide and examples are only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5. Multiple questions are 
used for each dimension to improve scoring accuracy. 
(1) Lay out of patient flow 
Tests how well the patient pathway is configured at the infrastructure level and whether staff pro-actively improve their own work-place organisation 
 
 
 a) Can you briefly describe the patient journey or flow for a typical episode? 
b) How closely located are wards, theatres, diagnostics centres and consumables? 
c) Has the patient flow and the layout of the hospital changed in recent years? How frequently do these changes occur and what are they driven by? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Lay out of hospital and organisation of 
workplace is not conducive to patient flow, 
e.g., ward is on different level from theatre, 
or consumables are often not available in 
the right place at the right time 
Lay out of hospital has been thought-through 
and optimised as far as possible; work place 
organisation is not regularly 
challenged/changed (or vice versa) 
Hospital layout has been configured to optimize patient 
flow; workplace organization is challenged regularly and 
changed whenever needed  
(2) Rationale for introducing standardisation/ pathway management 
Test the motivation and impetus behind changes to operations and what change story was communicated 
 
 
 a) Can you take me through the rationale for making operational improvements to the management of patient pathway? Can you describe a recent 
example?  
b) What factors led to the adoption of these practices? 
c) Who typically drives these changes? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Changes were imposed top down or 
because other departments were making 
(similar) changes, rationale was not 
communicated or understood 
Changes were made because of financial 
pressure and the need to save money or as a 
(short-term) measure to achieve government 
targets 
Changes were made to improve overall performance, 
both clinical and financial, with buy-in from all affected 
staff groups. The changes were communicated in a 
coherent ‘change story’ 
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(3) Continuous improvement 
Tests process for and attitudes to continuous improvement and whether things learned are captured/documented 
 
 
 a) How do problems typically get exposed and fixed?  
b) Talk me through the process for a recent problem that you faced 
c) How do the different staff groups get involved in this process? Can you give examples? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: No, process improvements are made when 
problems occur, or only involve one staff 
group 
Improvements are made irregular meetings 
involving all staff groups, to improve 
performance in their area of work (e.g., ward 
or theatre) 
Exposing problems in a structured way is integral to 
individuals’ responsibilities and resolution involves all 
staff groups, along the entire patient pathway as a part of 
regular business processes rather than by extraordinary 
effort/teams  
(4) Performance tracking 
Tests whether performance is tracked using meaningful metrics and with appropriate regularity 
 
 
 a) What kind of performance indicators would you use for performance tracking?  
b) How frequently are these measured? Who gets to see these data?  
c) If I were to walk through your hospital wards and theatres, could I tell how you were doing against your performance goals? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Measures tracked do not indicate directly if 
overall objectives are being met, e.g., only 
government targets tracked. Tracking is an 
ad-hoc process (certain processes aren’t 
tracked at all).  
Most important performance indicators are 
tracked formally; tracking is overseen by 
senior staff.  
Performance is continuously tracked and communicated 
against most critical measures, both formally and 
informally, to all staff using a range of visual 
management tools  
(5) Performance review 
Tests whether performance is reviewed with appropriate frequency and communicated with staff 
 
 
 a) How do you review your KPI’s?  
b) Tell me about a recent meeting  
c) Who is involved in these meetings? Who gets to see the results of this review? 
d) What is the follow-up plan? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance is reviewed infrequently or in 
an un-meaningful way e.g. only success or 
failure is noted 
Performance is reviewed periodically with 
both successes and failures identified.  
Results are communicated to senior staff. No 
clear follow up plan is adopted. 
Performance is continually reviewed, based on the 
indicators tracked. All aspects are followed up to ensure 
continuous improvement. Results are communicated to 
all staff.  
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(6) Performance dialogue 
Tests the quality of review conversations 
 
 
 a) How are these meetings structured?  
b) During these meetings do you find that you generally have enough data?  
c) What type of feedback occurs in these meetings?  
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: The right information for a constructive 
discussion is often not present or the quality 
is too low; conversations focus overly on 
data that is not meaningful. Clear agenda is 
not known and purpose is not explicitly. 
Next steps are not clearly defined 
Review conversations are held with the 
appropriate data present. Objectives of 
meetings are clear to all participating and a 
clear agenda is present. Conversations do 
not, drive to the root causes of the problems, 
next steps are not well defined 
Regular review/performance conversations focus on 
problem solving and addressing root causes. Purpose, 
agenda and follow-up steps are clear to all. Meetings are 
an opportunity for constructive feedback and coaching 
(7) Consequence management 
Tests whether differing levels of (personal) performance lead to different consequences (good or bad) 
 
 
 a) Let’s say you’ve agreed to a follow up plan at one of your meetings, what would happen if the plan weren’t enacted?  
b) How long is it between when a problem is identified to when it is solved? Can you give me a recent example?  
c) How do you deal with repeated failures in a specific sub-specialty or cost area? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Failure to achieve agreed objectives does 
not carry any consequences  
Failure to achieve agreed results is tolerated 
for a period before action is taken  
A failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining in 
identified areas of weakness or moving individuals to 
where their skills are appropriate 
(8) Target balance 
Test whether targets cover a sufficiently broad set of metrics 
 
 
 a) What types of targets are set for the hospital? What are the goals for your specialty?  
b) Tell me about goals that are not set externally (e.g. by the government, regulators).  
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals focussed only on government targets 
and achieving the budget 
Goals are balanced set of targets (including 
quality, waiting times, operational 
efficiency, and financial balance). Goals 
form part of the appraisal for senior staff 
only or do not extend to all staff groups. 
Real interdependency is not well understood 
Goals are a balanced set of targets covering all four 
dimensions (see left). Interplay of all four dimensions is 
understood by senior and junior staff (clinicians as well 
as nurses and managers) 
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(9) Target inter-connection 
Tests whether targets are tied to hospital/Trust objectives and how well they cascade down the organisation 
 
 
 a) What is the motivation behind your goals?  
b) How are these goals cascaded down to the different staff groups or to individual staff members? 
c) How are your targets linked to hospital performance and its goals? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals do not cascade down the organisation Goals do cascade, but only to some staff 
groups, e.g., nurses only 
Goals increase in specificity as they cascade, ultimately 
defining individual expectations, for all staff groups 
(10) Time horizon of targets 
Tests whether hospital/Trust has a ‘3 horizons’ approach to planning and targets 
 
 
 a) What kind of time scale are you looking at with your targets?  
b) Which goals receive the most emphasis? 
c) Are the long term and short term goals set independently? 
d) Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-run goals? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Top staff’s main focus is on short term 
targets  
There are short and long term goals for all 
levels of the organisation. As they are set 
independently, they are not necessarily 
linked to each other  
Long  term goals are translated into specific short term 
targets so that short term targets become a ‘staircase’ to 
reach long term goals  
(11) Target stretch 
Tests whether targets are appropriately difficult to achieve 
 
 
 a) How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them?  
b) On average, how often would you say that you meet your targets?  
c) Do you feel that on targets all specialties, departments or staff groups receive the same degree of difficulty? Do some groups get easy targets?  
d) How are the targets set? Who is involved? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals are either too easy or impossible to 
achieve, at least in part because they are set 
with little clinician involvement, e.g., 
simply off historical performance 
In most areas, senior staff push for 
aggressive goals based, e.g., on external 
benchmarks, but with little buy-in from 
clinical staff. There are a few sacred cows 
that are not held to the same standard 
Goals are genuinely demanding for all parts of the 
organisation and developed in consultation with senior 
staff, e.g., to adjust external benchmarks appropriately 
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(12) Clarity and comparability of targets 
Tests how easily understandable performance measures are and whether performance is openly communicated 
 
 
 a) If I asked your staff directly about individual targets, what would they tell me?  
b) Does anyone complain that the targets are too complex?  
c) How do people know about their own performance compared to other people’s performance?  
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance measures are complex and not 
clearly understood, or only relate to 
government targets. Individual performance 
is not made public 
Performance measures are well defined and 
communicated; performance is public at all 
levels but comparisons are discouraged  
Performance measures are well defined, strongly 
communicated and reinforced at all reviews;  
performance and rankings are made public to induce 
competition  
(13) Managing talent 
Tests what emphasis is put on talent management 
 
 
 a) How do senior staff show that attracting and developing talent is a top priority?  
b) Do senior managers, clinicians or nurses get any rewards for bringing in and keeping talented people in the hospital? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Senior staff do not communicate that 
attracting, retaining and developing talent 
throughout the organisation is a top priority  
Senior management believe and 
communicate that having top talent 
throughout the organisation is key to good 
performance 
Senior staff are evaluated and held accountable on the 
strength of the talent pool they actively build 
(14) Rewarding high performers 
Tests whether good performance is rewarded proportionately 
 
 
 a) How does your appraisal system work? Tell me about your most recent round.  
b) Are there any non-financial or financial (bonuses) rewards for the best performers across all staff groups? 
c) How does the bonus system work? 
d) How does your reward system compare to that at other comparable hospitals? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: People are rewarded equally irrespective of 
performance level  
There is an evaluation system for the 
awarding of performance related rewards 
that are non-financial (beyond progression 
through nursing grades or clinical excellence 
awards for doctors) at the individual level 
(but rewards are always or never achieved) 
There is an evaluation system for the awarding of 
performance related rewards, including personal 
financial rewards  
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(15) Removing poor performers 
Tests whether hospital is able to deal with underperformers 
 
 
 a) If you had a clinician or a nurse who could not do his job, what would you do? Could you give me a recent example?  
b) How long would underperformance be tolerated?  
c) Do you find staff members who lead a sort of charmed life? Do some individuals always just manage to avoid being fixed/fired?  
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Poor performers are rarely removed from 
their positions  
Suspected poor performers stay in a position 
for a few years before action is taken  
We move poor performers out of the hospital/department 
or to less critical roles as soon as a weakness is identified  
(16) Promoting high performers 
Tests whether promotion is performance based 
 
 
 a) Tell me about your promotion system?  
b) What about poor performers? What happens with them? Are there any examples you can think of?  
c) How would you identify and develop your star performers? 
d) Are better performers likely to promote fasters or are promotions given on the basis of tenure/seniority? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: People are promoted primarily on the basis 
of tenure 
People are promoted upon the basis of 
performance (across more than one 
dimension, e.g., isn’t related only to research 
or clinical excellence)  
We actively identify, develop and promote our top 
performers 
(17) Attracting talent 
Tests how strong the employee value proposition is 
 
 
 a) What makes it distinctive to work at your hospital, as opposed to your other similar hospitals?  
b) If I were a top nurse or clinician and you wanted to persuade me to work at your hospital, how would you do this?  
c) What don’t people like about working at your hospital?  
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Our competitors offer stronger reasons for 
talented people to join their hospitals  
Our value proposition to those joining our 
department is comparable to those offered by 
others hospitals 
We provide a unique value proposition to encourage 
talented people join our department above our 
competitors  
(18) Retaining talent 
Tests whether hospital/Trust will go out of its way to keep its top talent 
 
 
 a) If you had a top performing manager, nurse or clinician that wanted to leave, what would the hospital do?  
b) Could you give me an example of a star performer being persuaded to stay after wanting to leave?  
c) Could you give me an example of a star performer who left the hospital without anyone trying to keep them? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: We do little to try and keep our top talent We usually work hard to keep our top talent We do whatever it takes to retain our top talent across all 
three staff groups 
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APPENDIX B: DATA 
 
Sample 
The main sampling frame was all acute public sector hospitals (NHS “trusts”) in England.41 There were 
174 such units in 2006, but we dropped hospitals without orthopaedics or cardiology departments (e.g. 
specialist eye hospitals) so this left us with a sample of 164 possible hospital trusts. We obtained 161 
usable responses from 100 hospital trusts which represented 61% of the frame. We sought responses 
from up to four senior employees in each hospital: a manager and a clinician from two service lines 
(cardiology and orthopaedics). Table 1 shows the data is evenly split between the specialities (52% 
cardiology and 48% orthopaedics), but that it was harder to obtain interviews with the physicians than 
managers (80% of the respondents were managers). We interviewed one respondent in 53 hospitals, 
two respondents in 34 hospitals, three respondents in 12 hospitals and four respondents in one hospital. 
The correlation of the average management score across responders within the same hospital was high 
(0.53) as shown in Figure A1. 
 
We examined evidence for selection bias by estimating probit models of whether a trust responded on 
the observable characteristics used in our analyses. Table B2 contains the results of this exercise. There 
is no significant correlation at the 5% level between sample response and any of the performance 
measures or covariates and only one (from 16) of the indicators are significant at the 10% level. This 
suggests that there was little systematic response bias. 
 
In the regressions all interviews with many unanswered questions (three or more) are excluded as the 
information obtained is unlikely to be reliable. This excludes 3 interviews out of 164. We weight 
regressions by the inverse of the number of interviews so that hospitals with multiple responses are 
weighted less (we also cluster standard errors at the hospital level). 
 
Construction of the Pseudo HCC Rating  
In column (8) of Table 2 we reported our best effort to reconstruct the HCC’s rating. Although the 
exact method of creating the HCC ratings is not publicly known the Appendix of the HCC's “Annual 
Health Check 2006/2007” brochure mentions seven “domains” in which the hospitals need to achieve 
certain standards in order to achieve a high score.  
 
These domains are: safety, clinical and cost effectiveness, governance, patient focus, accessible and 
responsive care, public health, and care environment and amenities. From the datasets described above 
we choose eight variables which capture the requirements of these different domains. Infection rates 
and re-admission risk are chosen to represent the “safety” aspect; operational margin and income per 
medical full time equivalent capture the financial side; patient satisfaction covers the “patient focus” 
domain. Waiting times and average length of stay fall into the category “accessible and responsive 
care” and information on job satisfaction from the NHS staff survey is used to represent the “care 
environment and amenities” domain. 
  
 
 
                                                 
41 A trust can consist of more than one site (as a firm can consist of more than one plant). The median 
number of sites was 2 with a range from 1 to 10. 
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Table B1: Data Sources for hospital performance data 
 
Variable Notes Source 
Mortality within 28 days of emergency 
admission for AMI (in hospital and out of 
hospital) 
 During financial quarter 
 Defined according to NHS mortality 
rate Performance indicators (PIs) for 
2001/02  
ONS death records linked with Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), The NHS 
Information Centre for health and social care. 
  
Mortality within 30 days of surgery for 
selected emergency procedures. 
 
 During financial quarter 
 Defined according to NHS mortality 
rate PIs for 2001/02  
ONS death records linked with Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), The NHS 
Information Centre for health and social care. 
  
Waiting list size  At start of quarter (as proxied by end 
of previous quarter) 
Department of Health: Provider based waiting times/list statisticsa 
MRSA rates  During 6-month period 
 2001/02 (q1) to 2004/05 (q3) 
Health Protection Agency: Half-yearly reporting results for clostridium difficile 
infections and MRSA bacteraemia 
Financial Indicators: 
 Income per spell 
 Income per bed 
 Operating Margin 
 Trust Financial Returns 
Probability of leaving in next 12 months Respondents are asked to rate 
chances of leaving on a 1 to 5 scale. 
NHS Staff Surveyc (2006). 128,328 NHS staff responded and results are reported as 
average of scale by each trust 
Healthcare Commission ratingd All trusts are scored on a scale of 1 
to 4 on “resource use” and quality of 
“care” 
Our main indicator averages over the two measures and standardizes. We also 
construct our own “pseudo” HCC rating from the underlying indicators (see 
Appendix B for full description) 
Local authority all cause mortality rates   Calendar year  
 
Office of National Statistics 1995-2004 
Casemix of admissions: 
These are specific to the conditions (AMI, 
surgery, etc.) considered. For the general 
performance indicators (like HCC rating) 
we use case mix for all admitted patients. 
 Proportion of admitted patients in 
each sex-specific age band. 11 age 
categories: 0-15, 16-45, 46-50, 51-
55, 56-60, 61-65, 66-70, 71-75, 76-
80, 81-85, >85 and two genders, so 
up to 22 controls.  
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), The NHS Information Centre for health and 
social care. 
 
Notes: MRSA is Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus 
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a http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/nhsperformanceindicators/2002/trdca_t.doc. bhttp://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/index.htm 
chttp://www.cqc.org.uk/usingcareservices/healthcare/nhsstaffsurveys.cfm  
dhttp://www.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/0607_annual_health_check_performance_rating_scoring_rules_200702284632.pdf   
 
Variable Notes Source 
Number of admissions 
 Total admissions 
 AMI 
 Emergency Surgery 
 During financial quarter 
 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), The NHS Information Centre for health and 
social care. 
Number of Sites  Hospital Estates and Facilities Statisticsa, The NHS Information Centre for health 
and social care. 
Foundation Trust Status  Monitor (Foundation Trust Regulator)b
Specialist Hospital  Self-coded from individual hospital 
web pages 
 Only 2 in the sample: one specialist 
cardiology centre and a children 
hospital 
Self-coded 
Building Age Data is provided at the site level and 
aggregated up to hospital level using the 
surface area as weights 
Hospital Estates and Facilities Statisticsa, The NHS Information Centre for health 
and social care. 
Expenditure per patient  Cost divided by the number of total 
admissions 
Cost data from Trusts’ Annual Reports and Accounts, available from Trusts’ 
webpages or Monitorb (in the case of Foundation Trusts) 
 
Political Variables 
 Marginal Constituencies 
 Labour Vote Share 
 Winning Party 
 4 elections from 1992 until 2005 British Election Study 
ahttp://www.hefs.ic.nhs.uk/ReportFilter.asp  
bhttp://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/   
chttp://ratings2005.healthcarecommission.org.uk/Downloads/MoreInformationPageDocs/DetailedResultsAS.xls  
dhttp://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Statistics/Performancedataandstatistics/Beds/index.htm 
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Table B2: Tests of sample Selection for public hospitals 
 
Variable Marginal effect(Standard error) 
 
Observations 
Performance Measures   
Mortality rate from emergency AMI after 28 days (quarterly average) 0.129 (0.161) 133 
Mortality rate from emergency surgery after 30 days (quarterly average) 0.313 (0.365) 163 
Numbers on waiting list 0.025 (0.0454) 163 
Infection rate of MRSA per 10,000 bed days (half yearly) -0.025 (0.041) 163 
Operating margin (percent) 0.040 (0.032) 164 
Likelihood of leaving in next 12 months (1=very unlikely, 5=very likely) -0.063 (0.04) 161 
Average Health Care Commission  rating  (1-4 scale) -0.011 (0.043) 164 
Pseudo HCC rating (standardized) 0.027 (0.038) 164 
   
Size Variables   
Number of total admissions (per 100,000 population) 0.213 (0.417) 164 
Number of emergency AMI admissions (per 100,000 population) 53.896 (70.863) 164 
Number of emergency surgery admissions (per 100,000 population) 0.612 (4.739) 164 
Number of sites 0.016 (0.196) 164 
   
Covariates   
Foundation Trust (hospitals with greater autonomy) 0.091 (0.082) 164 
Building age -0.013 (0.013) 154 
Expenditure per patient (£ 1000) -0.015 (0.008)* 156 
Area mortality (average of local authorities in 30km radius, 0.275 (0.277) 163 
      per 100,000,000 population)   
 
Notes: These are the results from separate probit ML regression of whether a public hospital had any response to the survey on the relevant variable (e.g. AMI mortality rate in the first row). 
There is a population of 164 potential acute hospitals in England and we had 100 hospitals with at least one respondent. For the first 2 rows we use the same restrictions as in table 2: we use 
only hospitals with more than 150 yearly cases in the AMI regression and exclude specialist hospitals from the regression in the second row. *** indicates significance at 1% level; ** 
significance at 5%, * for significance at 10%. 
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Table B3: Full Results for Baseline Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of Regression OLS Reduced 
form 
1st Stage IV 
Dependent Variable Management
score 
Management
score 
Number 
Hospitals 
Management
score 
     
Number of Competing 0.120*   0.543** 
Hospitals (0.068)   (0.220) 
Proportion of Labour Marginal  2.800** 5.156***  
Constituencies  (1.162) (1.398)  
General Controls     
Number of Constituencies 0.038 0.074 0.152** -0.008 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.066) (0.062) 
Labour Share of Votes -0.017 -0.018 0.013 -0.025 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.025) 
Catchment Area Overall Mortality 0.002 0.002 -0.008 0.007 
Rate (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Foundation Trust Dummy 0.707*** 0.802*** 0.237 0.673*** 
 (0.169) (0.161) (0.314) (0.234) 
Proportion of Managers with 0.628 0.540 -0.501 0.813* 
Clinical Degree (0.384) (0.370) (0.353) (0.435) 
Dummy Clinicians and Managers 0.275* 0.290* -0.214 0.407** 
Take Decision Jointly (0.141) (0.148) (0.207) (0.175) 
Interview (Noise) Controls     
Clinician Dummy -0.680*** -0.636*** -0.134 -0.563*** 
 (0.166) (0.158) (0.166) (0.184) 
Interviewer Dummy 1 0.239 0.341 0.433 0.105 
 (0.654) (0.610) (0.348) (0.641) 
Interviewer Dummy 2 -0.491 -0.401 0.404 -0.620 
 (0.632) (0.588) (0.330) (0.613) 
Interviewer Dummy 3 0.249 0.492 0.534 0.201 
 (0.631) (0.588) (0.347) (0.610) 
Tenure in the Post -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.008 -0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) 
Population Controls     
Total Population in Catchment Area -0.529 -0.525 1.298* -1.230 
(unit: 1,000,000) (0.535) (0.538) (0.718) (0.826) 
Age-/ Gender-Controls 3.36*** 3.83*** 4.59*** 2.83*** 
(F-stat for 11 Variables)     
Case-Mix Controls     
Total Admissions 0.339*** 0.415*** 0.201 0.306*** 
(unit: 10,000) (0.103) (0.108) (0.146) (0.112) 
Age-/ Gender Controls 4.00*** 2.39*** 2.10*** 2.81*** 
(F-stat for 21 Variables)     
Observations 161 161 161 161 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. Competition is 
measured as the number of hospitals in a 30km radius around the hospital (the “catchment area”). A Political 
Constituency is defined as marginal if it was won by less than 5% in the 1997 UK General Election and the 
proportion of marginal constituencies is based on the 30km catchment area. The Labour share of votes is the 
absolute share obtained by the Labour party in the 1997 UK General Election averaged over all constituencies in 
the catchment area. Standard errors are clustered at a hospital level (the unit of observations is a service line in 
cardiology or orthopaedics). All variables in the regressions are reported in the table. The observations are 
weighted by the inverse of the number of interviews within the same hospital. 
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Figure A1: Correlation in management scores between independent first and 
second interviews on different managers or doctors in the same hospital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Plots the standardized management scores for hospitals where two (or more) independently run 
interviews have taken place on different managers and/or doctors in different departments. Weight is 
the inverse of the number of different hospital sites (correlation is 0.53). 
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